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Given the rapid growth in health care spending that is often attributed to technological change, many
private and public institutions are grappling with how to best assess and adopt new health care
technologies. The leading technology adoption criteria proposed in theory and used in practice
involve so called "cost-effectiveness" measures. However, little is known about the dynamic
efficiency implications of such criteria, in particular how they influence the R&D investments that
make technologies available in the first place. We argue that such criteria implicitly concern
maximizing consumer surplus, which many times is consistent with maximizing static efficiency
after an innovation has been developed. Dynamic efficiency, however, concerns aligning the social
costs and benefits of R&D and is therefore determined by how much of the social surplus from the
new technology is appropriated as producer surplus. We analyze the relationship between cost-
effectiveness measures and the degree of surplus appropriation by innovators driving dynamic
efficiency. We illustrate how to estimate the two for the new HIV/AIDS therapies that entered the
market after the late 1980's and find that only 5% of the social surplus is appropriated by innovators.
We show how this finding can be generalized to other existing cost-effectiveness estimates by
deriving how those estimates identify innovator appropriation for a set of studies of over 200 drugs.
We find that these studies implicitly support a low degree of appropriation as well. Despite the high
annual cost of drugs to patients, very low shares of social surplus may go to innovators, which may
imply that cost-effectiveness is too high in a dynamic efficiency sense.
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I. Introduction 
 
Technological change is often argued to be a central force behind the growth in health care 
spending.
2  Given this rapid growth, criteria used by private and public institutions to value the 
increase in health care spending therefore requires a methodology to measure the value of new 
health care technologies brought about by R&D investments.  There is a long-standing and vast 
health economics literature that attempts to assess the value of new technologies by use of so 
called cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, or cost-benefit analysis, hereafter referred to collectively as 
CE analysis.
3  This type of CE analysis has been the major method proposed to evaluate new 
inventions and has been argued to be central in managing new technologies, their adoptions, and 
their impact on long term health care spending. 
 
Although not explicitly stated as such, we argue that CE criteria are implicitly concerned 
with  estimating  the  observed  market  level  of  consumer  surplus  associated  with  a  given 
technology.  In particular, many technology assessments attempt to quantify the health impacts of 
new technologies for patients or health plans by comparing patient benefits with spending at 
observed  market  prices.    Examples  include  cost-effectiveness  using  spending  per  quality-  or 
disability adjusted life years, as is common by public buyers outside the US, or cost-benefit 
analysis monetizing mortality reductions through value-of-life estimates, as is common in studies 
assessing the gains of increased health care spending.  The central theme of such standard CE 
assessments performed in practice seems to be to measure consumer surplus or net consumer 
benefits. As is the norm in CE practice, technologies are deemed more valuable the larger is the 
patient- or health plan benefits above what is spent on them. 
 
However, when new technologies are brought to life from costly R&D, consumer surplus 
is a very poor guide to inducing optimal (second-best) R&D investments.  Rather, the degree to 
which  producer  surplus  captures  social  surplus,  often  at  the  expense  of  consumer  surplus, 
becomes the central issue that determines dynamic efficiency.  This, of course, is the rationale for 
the patent system, which substitutes producer surplus for consumer surplus in order to stimulate 
more efficient R&D investment.  Therefore, we argue that for the same reason that patents are 
preferred even though they lower consumer surplus after technologies are discovered, technology 
adoption criteria are preferred that do not only focus on consumer surplus.  Put differently, even 
though measured levels of CE would be higher without the patent system, since patients or health 
plans would spend less to get the same technology, dynamic efficiency would clearly be lowered.  
An illustrative case of the dangers of CE criteria may be vaccines, which many times have been 




As  consumer  surplus  or  cost-effectiveness  determines  static  efficiency  and  innovator 
appropriation determines dynamic efficiency, we analyze the relationship between the two.  In the 
case  of  monopoly  R&D,  we  arrive  at  the  stark  implication  that  many  times  both  dynamic 
efficiency  and  patient  health  are  maximized  when  CE  is  minimized.  We  show  how  this 
implication is altered under public R&D subsidies (such as those by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) in the US) and competition in R&D (leading to patent racing that may duplicate 
R&D efforts). 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Newhouse (1992). 
3 The literature is vast, but for examples, see Weinstein and Stason (1977), Johanneson  and Weinstein 
(1993), Gold et al. (1996), Meltzer (1997), Drummond et al. (1997), Garber and Phelps (1997), Garber 
(2000), Cutler and McClellan (2001), and Cutler (2005). 
4 A major concern here has, of course, been product liability issues. See e.g. Manning (1993).   3 
As the ability of innovators to appropriate the surplus of their innovations is central to 
dynamic efficiency, we estimate the degree of appropriation in an illustrative manner for  a major 
breakthrough in medicine—the new drugs to treat HIV/AIDS that entered the market from the 
late 1980’s onwards.
5  Our major finding is that innovators captured only 5% of the nearly $1.4 
trillion worth of social surplus arising from these new technologies.
6  Thus, despite the high 
prices of many therapies such as the new HIV drugs, the low degree of appropriation raises 
concerns about whether cost-effectiveness is too high in that it induces dynamic inefficiency.  
 
We generalize this finding by deriving why and how the CE results of over 200 studies 
on drugs can be implicitly viewed as identifying the degree of innovator appropriation. We derive 
conditions under which the measured level of CE of a technology may be used to identify the 
share  of  social  surplus  appropriated  by  producers  of  that  technology;  the  CE  of  a  given 
technology reveals information about the cost or demand parameters.  When such identification is 
feasible,  the  existing  and  vast  CE  literature  informs  us  about  the  degree  of  innovator 
appropriation.    We  find  that  25%  of  the  interventions  considered  have  estimated  levels  of 
appropriations of less than 7%, while 75% have appropriations less than 25%.  Our illustrative 
finding for HIV/AIDS drugs suggests their appropriation of social surplus is at the twentieth 
percentile of the 200 technologies considered. As complementary evidence, we show that these 
estimated  levels  of  innovator  appropriation  are  also  consistent  with  alternative  methods  of 
calculating appropriation based on price reductions after patent expiration and the identifying 
assumption of profit-maximization. 
 
The  paper  may  be  briefly  outlined  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  relationship 
between CE measures and dynamic efficiency.  Section 3 presents estimates of the share of social 
surplus appropriated by producers of the new HIV/AIDS drugs.  Section 4 generalizes these 
findings to traditional CE measures reported in the literature.  Lastly, section 5 concludes. 
 
II. Technology Assessment and Dynamic versus Static Efficiency 
 
In order to discuss how CE analysis relates to static and dynamic efficiency, for a given output 
level q denote the ex-post social surplus of a new technology by w(q).  This social surplus can be 
divided into a consumer surplus, z(q), and producer surplus (variable profits), p(q), as in: 
 
w(q) = z(q)+ p(q)    (1) 
 
For example, a commonly analyzed case is when price-discrimination is infeasible, in which case 
a given output level q induces both profits and consumer surplus according to: 
 
                                                 
5 This finding builds on and extends work of Philipson and Jena (2005) who argue that HIV/AIDS is an 
important case to consider in and of itself, partly because it is perhaps the major disease targeted by public 
sector R&D in the US.  Public R&D on HIV/AIDS was roughly $2 billion in 2000.  Health, in general, is 
among the three leading industries into which the government allocates its R&D, the other two being 
defense and aero-space.  The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is responsible for allocating the vast 
majority of the public R&D dollar—in 1999, NIH funding accounted for nearly 81% of public spending on 
health R&D.  Of the $13.9 billion that the NIH spent on research in that year, nearly $1.8 billion (13%) was 
spent on HIV/AIDS (Health, United States, 2002). 
6 Our findings relate to an existing literature on the general inability of innovators to capture the social 
value of their inventions, see e.g., Mansfield et al. (1977), Mansfield (1985), Levin et al. (1987), Hall 
(1996), and Nordhaus (2004).   4 
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where p(q) is the inverse demand function, c(q) is the variable cost function which excludes the 
fixed cost of R&D, and g(q) is the gross consumer benefit.  In the discussion that follows, we 
refer to the observed surplus as the surplus which results at the market quantity q.  The potential 
surplus  obtains  at  the  quantity  that  maximizes  w(q)—in  the  absence  of  ex-post  market 
imperfections, this is true at the competitive output. 
 
A. Cost-Effectiveness Criteria 
 
In  this  standard  framework,  we  argue  that  typical  CE  technology  evaluation  has  implicitly 
centered on consumer surplus, by focusing on how much patients benefit beyond what is spent on 
the technology after it has been developed.  Despite the many forms of such criteria developed to 
date, their basic goal seems to be to determine whether increased health care spending on new 
technologies is justified by “societal”, “health plan”, or “patient” benefits in terms of improved 
health.    Absent  from  the  discussion  has  been  the  effect  of  such  criteria  on  the  behavior  of 
innovators who make the technologies available in the first place.  Although static efficiency is 
often enhanced with increases in CE, as it implicitly concerns consumer surplus, these criteria are 
less understood in terms of how they relate to dynamic efficiency when the observed level of CE 
is the result of rational behavior by market participants. 
 
Common measures of CE ratios relate the (here monetized) patient benefits to observed 








= 1     (4) 
 
This measure (zR) expresses consumer benefits as a ratio to spending, similar to the standard 
consumer surplus measure (z) that expresses it as a difference between the two.  Ratios are often 
estimated through spending per quality- or disability-adjusted life years or through monetized 
versions of health benefits, in which the value of life is compared to observed spending levels.  
These  attempts,  however,  are  implicitly  related  to  the  size  of  consumer  surplus,  since  they 
compare  consumer  benefits  to  observed  spending  levels.
7    In  particular,  static  technology 
assessments in health care commonly rely upon the use of “cost-benefit”, “cost-utility”, or “cost-
effectiveness” criteria to determine under what circumstances the value (whose units depend on 
the measure) of a given technology exceeds what is spent on it.  Although it is true that CE 
                                                 
7 The implicit consumer surplus estimation of CE analysis differs from traditional economic analysis—the 
latter typically attempts to assess consumer surplus by estimation of demand schedules, by observing 
changes in demand during supply-induced price changes.  Importantly, the demand curve for a good 
summarizes the value to consumers of both its observed and unobserved attributes.  On the contrary, 
estimates of consumer surplus based on cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis are typically formed 
indirectly by monetizing observable consumer benefits, e.g. by use of value of life estimates to estimate the 
gross consumer benefit from mortality reductions.  
   5 
analysis concerns the ratio of gross benefit and spending, while consumer surplus concerns their 
difference, both change in the same direction with unilateral changes in costs and benefits. 
 
Regarding the estimated CE magnitudes, many empirical studies estimate and document 
zR ratios above unity for employed technologies (see e.g. references in Introduction).  Yet, it 
would be extremely surprising if correctly measured zR ratios were found to be below unity, at 
least in a standard market economy.  As an illustration, consider a private market for health care 
without public or private insurance, as might exist for certain elective surgeries in the US, such as 
e.g. plastic surgery.  A new plastic surgery technology would have a zR ratio above unity (if 
estimated correctly) if individuals bought the product only when their valuation of it exceeded the 
price. This, of course, would always be predicted under standard demand analysis. Although this 
expected and basic outcome has to be qualified by the presence of private or public insurance, it 
is supported by a large existing and growing empirical health economics literature on the cost-
effectiveness of recent innovations.
8 
 
More importantly, the fact that a technology is cost-effective in this way only reveals that 
there is a positive consumer surplus.  However, a positive consumer surplus is consistent with any 
output level, regardless of how high or low it is. Consequently, being cost-effective in this sense 
bears  no  relationship  to  either  static  or  dynamic  efficiency!  Even  if  output  is  not  at  the 
competitive  or  monopoly  level,  consumer  surplus  is  still  positive  and  hence  the  technology 
deemed  cost-effective.  The  problem  is  that  being  cost-effective  is  only  necessary  but  not 
sufficient for static or dynamic efficiency. 
 
B. Cost-Effectiveness and Dynamic Efficiency 
 
To consider the dynamic efficiency induced by common health care assessment criteria, one must 
consider how such criteria affect efficiency in the presence of technological change driven by 
endogenous  R&D.    Let  technological  change  be  characterized  by  x(r),  an  increasing, 
differentiable, and strictly concave function representing the probability of discovery for a given 
level of R&D undertaken, r.  The optimal level of R&D that maximizes expected payoffs for any 
hypothetical ex-post prize, k, is denoted r(k) and is defined by: 
 
[ ] r k r x k r
r
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Our assumptions about x(r) imply that r(k) is an increasing function so that R&D rises with the 
ex-post reward. 
 
Monopoly R&D Investments 
 
First consider the case of a single monopolist investing in R&D who receives a share, a, of the 
social  surplus  w,  where  0￿a￿1.  Then,  r(a·w)  represents  the  R&D  undertaken  when  those 
investing in R&D maximize expected profits.  If profits drive R&D investments, the expected 
social surplus is: 
 
) ( )] ( [ ) , ( w a r w w a r x w a E × - × × =     (6) 
 
where w = z + p is the social surplus ex-post.  This expression directly highlights the well-known 
implication that dynamic efficiency only occurs when those undertaking the costs of R&D have 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Cutler (2004).   6 
incentives that are properly aligned with society, which is true when social surplus is entirely 
appropriated as profits, i.e. a = 1 (see e.g. Arrow (1961) and Tirole (1988)).  In other words, the 
key factor driving dynamic inefficiency is that profits (p) are less than social surplus (w).  More 
importantly, the size of the consumer surplus, focused on by CE criteria, is what drives a wedge 
between profits and social surplus and hence leads to under-investment in R&D.  Indeed, in this 
setting, the dynamically efficient R&D investment is r(w), which is obtained when the entire 
social surplus is appropriated as profits. 
 
More generally, for any technology and preferences, the observed profits associated with 
a given level of social surplus can be written a·w.  The main issue, then, is that a < 1.  For 
example, when production is characterized by constant returns to scale, it can be shown that 
monopolists facing either linear or constant-elasticity demand earn profits that are proportional to 
the potential social surplus.  Specifically, a = 1/2 in the case of linear demand and a = [(￿ -1)/￿)]
￿ 
under constant elasticity of demand.
9,10  In general, if the total social surplus associated with a 
technology is w, the size of the under-investment in R&D is r(w)-r(p) = r(w)-r(w-z), which, since 
r(.) is an increasing function, rises with the consumer surplus focused on by CE criteria.  The fact 
that dynamic efficiency is driven by the appropriation of social surplus to innovators implies that 
substituting  producer  surplus  for  consumer  surplus  often  raises  dynamic  welfare.    This  is 
analogous to the argument that patents hurt static efficiency but raise dynamic efficiency by 
engaging in similar substitution. 
 
The important implication of this is that the CE associated with the ex-post market for a 
technology is not clearly and monotonically related to measures of static or dynamic efficiency.  
Indeed, in a private market with perfect price discrimination, dynamically efficient R&D occurs 
because the innovator captures the entire social surplus.  Therefore, the dynamically optimal 
allocation of surpluses implies that the consumer surplus should be minimized, as opposed to 
maximized under a CE criteria, to enhance dynamic efficiency.  In this case, dynamic efficiency 
dictates that a technology should just break even ex-post (i.e., zR = 1) and that empirical studies 
citing more cost-effective technologies are, in fact, documenting a dynamic inefficiency!  Indeed, 
as discussed, the underinvestment in R&D from its socially optimal level, r(w) - r(w-z), rises with 
how “cost-effective” a technology is assessed to be according to traditional CE analysis.  In this 
case, the dynamically efficient minimization of CE is a direct implication of the classic problem 
of non-appropriation by innovators leading to under-investment in R&D.  Importantly, note that 
minimization of CE in this context still maximizes patient health (as full demand for the health 
care product obtains) though not consumer surplus. 
 
Competitive R&D Investments and Appropriation 
 
There are important instances in which full appropriation of social surplus by producers may not 
be dynamically optimal, a primary one being competitive R&D through so-called patent racing.  
Since competitive R&D leads to an equilibrium level of R&D that is determined by the average 
(rather than marginal) profit associated with entry, non-appropriation may enhance efficiency by 
taxing the over-provision of R&D.  This may be particularly relevant to the debate over excessive 
                                                 
9 The social surplus implicit in these results is the potential social surplus available to innovators, i.e. the 
social surplus that obtains when price is set at its competitive level.  This differs from the observed social 
surplus available to the monopolist, which obtains when price and quantity are determined by the 
monopolist. 
10 Interestingly, profits may even exceed the private social surplus (i.e. the gross benefit to consumers net 
of costs of production) when there are external effects in consumption.  See, for e.g., Philipson, Mechoulan, 
and Jena (2006) who discuss R&D under altruism in health care.   7 
R&D into so-called “me-too” drugs in the pharmaceutical area.  If the total fraction of surplus 
appropriated by successful R&D efforts is a, where 0￿a￿1, the equilibrium level of R&D r is 
determined by the zero-profit condition: 
 
r aw r x = × ] [     (7) 
 
where x(.) is the probability of discovery given the total investment in R&D by all firms, r.  Given 
this particular form of the R&D process, it is straightforward to show that the optimal level of 
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At  the  optimum,  surplus  appropriation  equals  the  elasticity  of  R&D  productivity  (i.e.  the 
percentage increase in the probability of discovery given a 1 percent increase in the level of 
R&D).  Our assumptions on x(.), namely concavity and zero probability of success in the absence 
of R&D, imply that the optimal surplus appropriation is less than one—the extent to which this 
occurs depends on the nature of R&D productivity, x(.).
12 
 
If such patent races lead R&D to be over-provided, our conclusions emphasizing under-
provision of R&D under monopoly R&D may be altered.  However, there appears to be an almost 
universal policy towards subsidizing (as opposed to taxing) R&D, such that most nations have 
decided  that  the  forces  operating  towards  over-provision  are  dominated  by  those  operating 
towards  under-provision.    In  light  of  this,  although  incentives  favoring  over-provision  may 
change the quantitative conclusions of our analysis, the qualitative conclusion that CE criteria 
limit  already  under-provided  R&D  seems  generally  applicable  to  most  research  areas  and 
countries. 
 
Public R&D Subsidies and Appropriation 
 
Another important case in which non-full appropriation may be optimal is when publicly funded 
R&D comprises a significant portion of total R&D, as is common in US health care through NIH.  
Since the dynamically optimal level of total R&D is still r = r(w), the presence of publicly funded 
R&D  implies  that  the  optimal  private  R&D  (and  hence,  appropriation)  should  be  lowered 
accordingly.  More precisely, consider the expected social surplus in the presence of publicly 
funded R&D, s, and surplus appropriation, a, where 0￿a￿1: 
 
) ( )] ( [ ) , , ( w a r s w w a r s x w a s E × - - × × + =   (9) 
 
                                                 
11 This follows from the zero-profit condition and the FOC for the expected welfare, x’[r(aw)]w = 1. 
12 An interesting case to consider is when R&D productivity is characterized by x(r) = 1 – p
r, where 0￿p￿1.  
In this case, one can show that the optimal level of R&D is r* = ln[-1/(w￿ln(p))]/ln(p) and the optimal 
appropriation is a* = -[r*￿(p
r*)￿(ln(p))]/(1-p
r*).  For an ex-post surplus of $1 trillion (which we argue is 
roughly the case for HIV/AIDS), the optimal appropriation may be as low as 5% (when R&D is very 
productive and the optimal R&D is $40 billion) or perhaps as high as 80% (when the optimal R&D is $270 
billion).  The extent to which appropriation deviates from one depends on the productivity of R&D, as a 
lower p implies more productive R&D.   8 
The probability of discovery is determined by the sum of public and private R&D, the latter being 
driven by the appropriation of ex-post surplus by producers. For a given level of subsidization the 
optimal appropriation satisfies: 
 
1 )] ( [ ' = × + × w a r s x w     (10) 
 
which implies s + r(a￿w) = r(w).  Applying the implicit function theorem, this implies that an 
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Hence, appropriation falls with subsidization. In particular, appropriation is unity in the absence 
of subsidization and less than unity under a positive subsidy.  Put differently, since the marginal 
product of private R&D is decreasing in the level of subsidized R&D, private R&D (and hence 
appropriation) optimally falls as its public counterpart increases. 
 
III. Surplus Appropriation for the New HIV/AIDS Drugs 
 
The previous discussion highlighted the importance of surplus appropriation by innovators (and 
hence low levels of CE) to dynamic efficiency, even if that level of appropriation was not full.  
As the ability of innovators to appropriate the potential surplus of their innovations is central to 
dynamic efficiency, we illustrate the degree of appropriation for the new drugs to treat HIV/AIDS 
that entered the market from the late 1980s onwards. This analysis will then be used to illustrate 
how more generally levels of innovator appropriation may be inferred from existing CE estimates 
in the literature. 
 
A. Estimates of Gross Consumer Benefits 
 
The  value  of  life  induced  by  new  drug  therapies  is  the  value  of  increased  survival  for  all 
individuals who choose treatment, relative to a benchmark in which no (or worse) therapies exist.  
In a related work, we develop a methodology to value the increases in survival attributable to the 
now  standard  treatments  for  HIV/AIDS.    The  thought  experiment  behind  the  analysis  is  the 
following.    For  a  hypothetical  individual  infected  in  a  given  year  t,  we  examine  how  that 
individual’s survival under treatment (St) compares to a counterfactual, baseline survival in which 
no drugs are available (So).
13  We then attach a monetary value to that increased survival and sum 
across all infected individuals in that cohort.  This process is repeated for each set of cases, cohort 
by cohort, since the start of the epidemic and aggregated up. 
 
This approach delivers the potential aggregate value of life induced by treatment, i.e. the 
value of life obtained when all infected individuals receive treatment.  This implicitly assumes 
that at the competitive output, all individuals infected with HIV (i.e. the full incidence) consume 
drug therapy.  At the competitive output, the ex-post social surplus arising from a technology is 
highest and therefore represents the potential surplus available for appropriation.  This differs 
                                                 
13 The ideal counterfactual survival in the absence of treatment (So) is the cross-sectional survival of 
individuals infected at the start of the epidemic, here taken to be 1980.  St is the longitudinal (i.e., lifetime) 
survival of individuals infected in year t.  The use of longitudinal survival captures the benefit to 
individuals infected with HIV prior to 1987 (when drug therapy first became available) who survive until 
then and consequently face improved life-expectancy due to treatment.   9 
from the observed gross value of life induced by treatment, which depends on the number of 
individuals who actually receive treatment. 
 
The aggregate potential gross consumer benefit, g, induced by the new drug consumption 
is calculated by multiplying the size (or incidence) of cohort t, nt, by the monetary value of 
increased  survival  and  summing  over  all  calendar  years.    Moreover,  the  aggregate  observed 
consumer benefit can be calculated by replacing nt with the number of individuals in that cohort 












t g n g b     (12) 
 
where gt = g(So, St), or the monetary value of increasing survival from the baseline survival So to 
the higher future survival faced by cohort t, St. The gain in survival, gt, is calculated using the 
infra-marginal valuation formula of Becker et al. (2005).
14 
 
To empirically implement the calculation of aggregate potential consumer benefits, we 
apply these formulas to published levels of HIV incidence and estimated changes in survival 
induced by HIV/AIDS drugs (see Philipson and Jena (2005) for a detailed discussion of the 
various data sources and methods used to estimate improvements in survival).
15  We estimate that 
the average individual infected with HIV experienced an increase in life-expectancy of roughly 
15 years since the start of the epidemic, from 19 to 34 years.
16  These improvements in survival 
are due to increases in both the time to onset of AIDS (after being infected with HIV) and the 
period of time alive after a diagnosis of AIDS. 
 
As  described  earlier,  the  potential  value  of  improved  survival  for  a  given  cohort  is 
computed  by  multiplying  that  cohort’s  incidence  of  HIV  by  the  value  of  increased  survival 
experienced by a single individual receiving treatment in that cohort. Table 1 presents this value 







                                                 
14 The value of an infra-marginal change in survival from So to St under a yearly income yt is determined by 
V[yt + et, So] = V[yt, St], where V is the indirect lifetime utility function and et is the yearly compensation 
required to make the hypothetical individual indifferent between the two survival frontiers.  The lifetime 
value for the gain in survival (gt) is calculated by summing the yearly compensation (et) over time, 
discounting by the rate of interest and the new survival probability. 
15 Importantly, our estimated survival curves are weighted averages across individuals receiving and not 
receiving treatment.  Thus, for each cohort, the reported survival is lower than survival among only those 
receiving treatment, St.  We assume our reported curves to be empirical analogs for St and therefore 
underestimate the aggregate observed and potential benefits of treatments introduced to date. 
16 These figures are consistent with those in the literature (see e.g. Lichtenberg, 2005).  To further examine 
the robustness of these estimates, we predict the number of individuals alive with HIV/AIDS in 2003, 
based on the annual reported incidence of HIV and our estimated survival curves.  We then compare this to 
the reported number of individuals living with HIV/AIDS in 2003.  The predicted and reported figures 
differ by only 12,000 people (out of nearly 1 million alive with HIV/AIDS).   10 
Table 1: Value of Gains in Survival for HIV Infected Individuals 
 
    Value of Survival Gains ($) 









1980  20,000  17,655  0.35 
1985  160,000  146,874  23.50 
1990  40,000  322,311  12.89 
1995  40,000  613,839  24.55 
2000  40,000  740,515  29.62 
Total Discounted Value  398 
All figures are discounted to 1980 and are in year 2000 dollars.  
The  total  discounted  value  includes  all  years  from  1980  to 
2000. 
 
These results demonstrate that the aggregate potential value of improved survival experienced by 
all individuals infected with HIV to date has been nearly $400 billion.  This, of course, ignores 
the value of increasing survival for all individuals who have not contracted HIV yet. To add this 
component, we forecast the value to future cohorts of HIV infected individuals by assuming that 
all cohorts experience the same aggregate gain in survival gt as the last cohort, 2000.  Assuming 
that the future incidence of HIV is equivalent to the last period, we calculate the discounted sum 
of future gains for individuals infected with HIV in the future.  We then add this amount to the 
value to date shown above, namely $398 billion.   This leads to an aggregate potential value of 
increased survival for all past and future cohorts of nearly $1.4 trillion. 
 
The aggregate observed value of improved survival can be calculated from data on the 
annual  number  of  individuals  in  a  given  cohort  who  later  receive  HIV/AIDS  drug  therapy.  
Specifically, if St characterizes the survival of someone infected with HIV in year t who receives 
treatment,  the  aggregate  observed  consumer  benefit  for  that  cohort  equals  the  number  of 
individuals in that cohort who receive treatment multiplied by the value of increased survival, 
g(So, St).  We use published data from the HIV Cost and Services Utilization Study (HCSUS) to 
approximate the number of individuals in a given cohort receiving treatment.  According to the 
study, between 60 and 85 percent of HIV infected individuals report some form of anti-retroviral 
therapy  (Shapiro,  et  al.,  1999).
17    Assuming  a  mid-range  estimate  of  70%,  this  implies  an 
incidence  of  anti-retroviral  consumers  equal  to  70%  of  HIV  incidence  and  a  corresponding 
aggregate observed benefit to all past and future cohorts of $980 billion (i.e., $1.4 trillion*0.7). 
 
B. Producer Surplus 
 
The overall producer surplus obtained from R&D is determined by the present value of producer 
surplus to firms producing HIV/AIDS drugs.  We apply existing estimates of markups for brand-
name drugs (as estimated from patent expirations) to approximate variable costs as 15% of sales.  
Using estimates of national spending on HIV/AIDS drugs obtained from IMS Health and reported 
                                                 
17 One could use annual data on aggregate sales and market prices to estimate the number of individuals 
receiving treatment.  However, since the annual market quantity is composed of users from all infected 
cohorts, additional assumptions must be made to infer the share of individuals in a given infection-cohort 
who ultimately receive drug therapy.   11 
by Lichtenberg (2005), this implies lifetime sales of HIV/AIDS drugs of roughly $74 billion with 
corresponding profits (variable costs) of $63 billion ($11 billion).  These estimates assume future 
sales are equivalent to year 2000’s patent-protected sales.  If the current level of output is 70% of 
the competitive level, the variable cost of production is $16 billion when all infected individuals 
are treated. 
 
Using the above figures, we can decompose the total lifetime value of HIV/AIDS drugs 
into consumer surplus, producer surplus (profits), and production costs.  Recall that we estimated 
the total potential value, g, to be nearly $1.4 trillion, discounted to 1980 and in year 2000 dollars.  
This  is  the  value  that  accrues  when  all  infected  individuals  receive  treatment  and  implies  a 
potential social surplus of nearly $1.38 trillion ($1.4 trillion - $16 billion).  With lifetime profits 
of $62.9 billion, producers appropriate only 5% of the potential social surplus available from their 
inventions
18.  We can make similar calculations regarding the share of observed surplus captured 
by producers.  Recall that the observed surplus is driven by the observed market quantity rather 
than the competitive quantity which results if all infected individuals receive treatment.  With 
observed  gross  benefits  of  $980  billion,  profits  of $62.9  billion,  and  variable costs  of  $11.1 
billion, consumers capture 7% of the social surplus available at the observed market quantities 
(consumer surplus = $906 billion, social surplus = $969 billion).
19 
 
IV. Extending the Analysis to Traditional Cost-Effectiveness Studies 
 
Given the low estimated share of social surplus appropriated by producers of HIV/AIDS drugs, 
this raises the question of whether producers of similarly CE technologies appropriate comparable 
amounts of social surplus.  And if so, can these results be generalized to obtain appropriation 
estimates that vary with a technology’s observed level of cost-effectiveness?  We begin this 
section by discussing conditions under which the often estimated CE of a given technology may, 
in fact, be used to infer the share of social surplus appropriated by producers of that technology. 
 
Recall from our earlier discussion that the observed ratio of gross benefit to spending, zR, 
can be written as g(q)/[p(q)q].  Similarly, the degree of observed surplus appropriation can be 
written as ￿(q)/w(q), where w(q) is the observed social surplus associated with a level of output q, 
and ￿(q) is the level of profit induced by that quantity.  If m(q)=p(q)/[c(q)/q] is the markup above 
average costs, it is straightforward to show that for a given level of output, appropriation may be 
written as a function of the CE level as in
20: 
 
                                                 
18 It is interesting to note that the small estimated share of social surplus appropriated by investors sheds 
important light on the recent growth of alternative funding mechanisms to stimulate HIV/AIDS research, 
e.g. through advance purchasing contracts of governments or private foundations.  Given that there is a 
social surplus above a trillion dollars that is not appropriated by R&D investors, a few billion dollars added 
to stimulate innovation, as these public or private contracts seem to provide, seems to pale in comparison to 
interventions that would better allow innovators to capture the value of their innovations.  Moreover, since 
both spending and markups are higher in the US than in the rest of the world (drug sales in the US account 
for more than half of worldwide spending) and price controls dominate foreign markets, estimates of 
appropriation based on US markets alone over-estimate worldwide appropriation.   
19 Our estimated result on appropriation is consistent with observed expenditures on HIV/AIDS drugs.  For 
example, Lichtenberg (2005) estimates annual drug spending per HIV infected individual in 2001 to be 
$9,751 in 2001 dollars, implying a net profit of approximately $8,300 for that individual (assuming variable 
costs are 15% of spending, i.e. $1,400).  A value of a life year of $100,000 is consistent with existing 
estimates and implies an observed surplus appropriation of roughly 8% (e.g. $8,300/($100,000 - $1,400)).   
20 To see this, note that ￿(q) = p(q)q – c(q) and w(q) = g(q) – c(q).  Substituting zR = g(q)/[p(q)q] into the 












    (13) 
 
This  expression  demonstrates  that  highly  cost-effective  technologies  (those  with  high  zR) 
implicitly support low levels of observed surplus appropriation.  Moreover, when free-entry is 
possible and firms earn zero profits (price = average cost), surplus appropriation is zero.  The 
general point, then, is that with information on the degree of market power in an industry, one can 
use commonly reported CE estimates to infer the degree of appropriation by producers of the 
relevant technology. 
 
For the case of HIV/AIDS, calculating the appropriation ratio based on our estimates is 
straightforward.  First, recall that we estimated observed gross benefits to consumers to be nearly 
$980 billion with spending levels of $74 billion.  This implies a CE or zR ratio of roughly 13.   
Estimates of the average markup can, in turn, be obtained from information on price reductions 
after patent expiration, which suggests that average costs are as low as 15% of patented prices.  
Put  together,  the  average  markup  and  estimated  CE  of  HIV/AIDS  drugs  imply  a  producer 
appropriation  of  observed  social  surplus  of  7%,  identical  to  our  directly  estimated  level  of 
appropriation. 
 
With more restrictive cost and demand assumptions, even less information is needed to 
infer the level of appropriation from CE estimates.  Under constant returns to scale and constant 
elasticity  demand,  it  can  be  shown  that  a  technology’s  CE  alone  identifies  its  elasticity  of 
demand, which in turns identifies the share of surplus appropriated by the producers of that 
technology.  These assumptions also allow us to distinguish between appropriation of two types 
of  surpluses  discussed  earlier,  observed  versus  potential.    To  be  sure,  the  observed  surplus 
(presented in equation 13) is the surplus which obtains at the market quantity.  For example, for a 
monopoly  quantity  qm,  the  appropriation  of  observed  surplus  is  simply  ￿(qm)/w(qm).  
Alternatively, the potential surplus is that which results if the market quantity is determined 
competitively (q = qc) and hence relates to the total potential surplus available to an innovator.  
Importantly, the size of profits relative to the potential social surplus is most relevant to dynamic 
policy.  For a monopoly quantity qm, the appropriation of potential surplus is ￿(qm)/w(qc).  Since 
there  is  a  deadweight  loss  associated  with  monopoly  pricing,  the  potential  surplus  from  an 
innovation  exceeds the  observed  surplus.    Consequently,  estimates  of ‘surplus’  appropriation 
based on observed surplus will underestimate the deficiency in appropriation by producers of a 
given technology. 
 
More  precisely,  consider  the  common  model  where  variable  costs  exhibit  constant 
returns, c(y) = cy, and there is a constant elasticity demand curve p(q) = x/q
1/￿, where ￿ > 0 is the 
elasticity of demand with respect to price and x is a scale factor that shifts demand outward.  If qc 
and qm denote the competitive and monopoly output, respectively, the Appendix shows that the 
















  (14) 
 
In other words, a technology’s CE, as described by the ratio of gross benefit to spending, is 
directly related to the familiar percentage markup of price over marginal cost.  In addition, the   13 
share of potential surplus appropriated as profits under optimal monopoly pricing equals the 
output expansion due to competition.





















    (15) 
 
This interesting result states that, counter-intuitively, the more a monopolist restricts output, as 
perhaps estimated by patent expirations, the less of the surplus it is appropriated.
22  Note that as 
the  elasticity  approaches  unity  (below  which  profits  are  infinite)  from  above,  the  profits, 
themselves, rise but as a share of social surplus go to zero.
23  This occurs because the non-
appropriated consumer surplus rises faster than profits as the elasticity falls.  Moreover, as market 
power  declines  and  elasticity  approaches infinity,  the  share  of  social surplus appropriated  as 
profits tends to roughly 37%.
24  Finally, there is a direct negative relationship between cost-
effectiveness and innovator appropriation. 
 
Under these assumptions, a given estimated CE or zR ratio implies a specific elasticity of 
demand, which in turn implies the degree to which a firm appropriates social surplus.  In the case 
of HIV/AIDS, for which zR is roughly 13, the implied elasticity of demand is around 1.08, which 
(according to equation 16) implies a producer share of potential social surplus of 6%.  This can be 
compared to our directly estimated share of potential surplus appropriation of 5%.
25 
 
More generally, the above relationship between CE and surplus appropriation can be used 
to infer the share of potential surplus appropriated by those producers whose technologies are 
examined  in  existing  CE  studies.    Figure  1,  below,  graphs  the  relationship  between  surplus 
appropriation, cost-effectiveness, and market power (interpreted as a reduction in the elasticity of 
demand).  As market power decreases, the producer’s share of potential social surplus approaches 
slightly more than a third, while zR approaches 1.  As described earlier, zR is bounded from below 
by unity since individuals only purchase goods for which the benefits exceed the costs. 
                                                 
21 It is straightforward to show that the share of observed surplus appropriated by producers is (￿-1)/(2￿-1), 
which is greater than the potential surplus appropriated. 
22 This result may not be unique to this particular demand structure.  For a linear demand curve, it is well 
known that monopoly output is half the competitive output and that a monopolist always appropriates half 
the surplus, so that the surplus condition above holds.  
23 It may even be that demand and cost parameters do not affect the share of surplus appropriated by the 
producer.  This is the case when demand is linear (as often estimated) and there are constant returns to scale 
in production, in which case the share appropriated by producers is always two thirds. 
24 Note that while (￿-1)/￿ approaches unity as elasticity becomes infinite, [(￿-1)/￿]
￿ does not do the same. 
25 Given that the share of observed surplus appropriated by producers is (￿-1)/(2￿-1), an elasticity of 1.08 
(implied by the observed zR of 13 for HIV/AIDS) suggests an observed level of appropriation of 7%, 
identical to our directly estimated level.   14 













































































The above figure illustrates how one can potentially use estimates of cost-effectiveness from the 
large health economic literature to infer the share of surplus appropriated by producers of the 
relevant  technology.    For  example,  consider  the  technologies  to  treat  HIV/AIDS.    With  an 
estimated ratio of gross benefit to spending of roughly 13, this implies an elasticity of demand of 
1.08 and a producer share of potential social surplus of a twentieth. 
 
We exemplify this general identification strategy using estimates of cost-effectiveness 
from  the  literature.    Neumann  et  al.  (2000)  review  the  cost-effectiveness  of  more  than  200 
pharmaceuticals using the established “cost-utility” method which focuses on costs per QALY 
gained and therefore concern both the prolongation and quality of life.  The authors note that 
while no accepted standards exist for how much benefit a technology must confer to be deemed a 
“good value,” the range between $50,000 and $100,000 per QALY has been a benchmark for the 
US.  In the context of our framework, this value (or range) is the gross benefit to consumers of a 
technology  which  leads  to  an  additional  quality  adjusted  year  of  life.    Table  2  presents  the 
spending  required  to  obtain  an  additional  QALY  for  several  interventions  reviewed  by  the 
authors.  For example, an intervention with a price of $1,000 that leads to an increase in 0.2 
QALYs requires the same spending per QALY as an intervention with a price of $5,000 that 
leads  to  an  additional  QALY.    While  the  magnitude  of  gross  benefit  differs  across  the  two 
interventions, the gross benefit per QALY is the same (namely in the range described above).  
Thus,  assuming  the  gross  benefit  arising  from  an  additional  quality  adjusted  year  of  life  is 
between  $50,000  and  $100,000,  we  can  compute  estimates  of  the  ratio  of  gross  benefit  to 
spending  per  QALY  for  these  interventions,  as  well  as  the  implied  shares  of  social  surplus 
appropriated by producers. 
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Table 2: Estimated Producer Share of Potential Social Surplus for Several Cost-Effective 
Technologies 
 
Intervention  Spending 




Producer  Share  of 
Surplus 
    $50,000  $100,000  $50,000  $100,000 
Captopril Therapy  4,000  12.5  25  0.06  0.03 
Hormone  Replacement 
Therapy 
12,000  4.2  8.4  0.15  0.09 
INH Prophylaxis  18,000  2.8  5.6  0.20  0.12 
Hip Fracture Prevention  34,000  1.5  3.0  0.30  0.19 
Chemotherapy  for  Breast 
Cancer 
58,000  .9  1.8  ---  0.26 
Notes:  CE and producer share of surplus are presented for two, separate values of an additional quality 
adjusted life year.  The final intervention has a gross benefit less than cost when gross benefit per QALY 
equals $50,000. 
Description of Interventions—1) Captopril therapy in patients  with  myocardial infarction, 2) Hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT), 3) Isoniazid (INH) prophylaxis for tuberculosis, 4) Treatment to prevent hip 
fracture  in  patients  with  osteoporosis,  and  5)  Chemotherapy  for  breast  cancer.    For  a  more  detailed 
description, see Neumann et al. (2000). 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that, as illustrated by the case of HIV/AIDS, those technologies deemed to 
be  extremely  cost  effective  may  also  result  in  low  surplus  appropriation  by  producers.    For 
example, the highly cost effective Captopril therapy results in only 3% - 6% of potential social 
surplus going to producers. 
 
While Table 2 presents estimates of the producer share of social surplus for only five 
interventions, cost-effectiveness estimates from a large, random sample of interventions could be 
used to estimate the distribution of producer shares.  We use data from over 200 published cost-
utility analyses contained in the Harvard Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) Registry to estimate 
this distribution.
26  Including analyses from 1976 to 2001, the Registry reports the spending per 
QALY of various interventions compared to benchmark comparator groups.  This spending per 
QALY can in turn be used to estimate the share of potential social surplus appropriated by the 
producer of that technology, as in Table 2 above.
27  This can be compared to estimates of the 
producer’s actual appropriation, identified by the technology’s CE and average mark-up as in 
expression (13) above. The average mark-up is based on our earlier assumption that average costs 
are 15% of patented prices. Figure 2 plots the distribution of observed and potential producer 
shares for the interventions considered.  Because the studies included in the Registry may not be a 
random sample of all technologies, however, we can only estimate the distribution of producer 
shares conditional on inclusion into the Registry. 
 
                                                 
26 The Registry is not limited to only pharmaceutical interventions.  More detailed information can be 
found at:  http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cearegistry/ 
27 For these calculations, we assume the gross benefit of an additional QALY to be $100,000.  
Consequently, we limit our attention to those interventions with published costs of less than $100,000 per 
QALY gained.   16 
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Since the constant elasticity of demand assumption predicts a producer appropriation of social 
surplus of no more than 37%, all interventions considered in Figure 2 have estimated producer 
shares less than this amount.  The median intervention requires a spending per QALY of roughly 
$19,000, which corresponds to a producer share of potential (actual) social surplus of nearly 13% 
(17%).
28  Moreover, 25% of the interventions considered have estimated potential appropriations 
of  less  than  7%,  while  75%  have  appropriations  less  than  a  fourth.    Moreover,  75%  of  the 
interventions have an actual appropriation of less than 40%.  If the estimated distribution of 
producer shares generalizes to the distribution across all health interventions (i.e., not only those 
included in the Registry), our empirical finding for producers of HIV/AIDS drugs suggests their 
appropriation of potential social surplus is at the twentieth percentile. 
 
Our estimates of appropriation can be compared to alternative, theory-based methods of 
calculating  this  share.    Specifically,  given  the  previously  described  relationship  between  the 
elasticity of demand and the share of potential social surplus appropriated by innovators, one can 
use information on price reductions after patent expiration to estimate patent-protected markups 
(Caves et al. (1991).
29  These markups identify the elasticity of demand for the patent-protected 
drugs and thus the share of surplus allocated to the producer.  In particular, the larger is the price 
reduction upon patent-expiration, the lower is the elasticity and the smaller is the share of surplus 
allocated to the producer.  Existing estimates suggest that price reductions are on the magnitude 
of 85% percent, implying a demand-elasticity around 1.17.  This elasticity implies a producer 
share of social surplus of 10%, which is highly related to our major finding that the share of 
                                                 
28 If the gross benefit of an additional QALY is assumed to be $50,000 (rather than $100,000), the median 
intervention has an implied producer share of social surplus closer to 20%. 
29 Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991) estimate that with 20 generic competitors, the ratio of prices 
between generic- and brand-drugs is roughly 17%.  We use the price of generic drugs as an upper bound of 
the marginal costs of production.    17 
social surplus appropriated by R&D investors in this area is, in fact, quite low.  This is true even 
though prices for these drugs are high, presumably due to the inelastic nature of demand. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
 
We argued that popular technology assessment criteria in health care going under the 
rubric of “cost-effectiveness” are often implicitly concerned with maximizing the observed level 
of consumer surplus, which is many times consistent with maximizing static efficiency after an 
innovation has been developed.  Dynamic efficiency, however, aligns the social costs and benefits 
of  R&D  and  is  therefore  determined  by  the  how  much  of  the  social  surplus  from  a  new 
technology  is  appropriated  by  innovators.    For  the  case  of  HIV/AIDS,  our  earlier  estimates 
suggested  that  producers  appropriated  only  5%  of  the  social  surplus  arising  from  new  drug 
therapies.    Given  the  low  degree  of  appropriation  by  producers  of  the  highly  cost-effective 
HIV/AIDS therapies, we showed how other CE estimates in the literature could be related to the 
standard framework—our main finding was that these CE estimates implicitly support a low 
degree of surplus appropriation by producers, comparable to our directly measured estimates for 
HIV/AIDS.  Despite the high annual costs of these drugs to patients, the low share of social 
surplus  going  to  innovators  raises  concerns  about  advocating  cost-effectiveness  criteria  that 
would further reduce appropriation share, and hence further reduce dynamic efficiency. 
 
In addressing why producer surplus is so small, and why the CE of therapies may be 
inefficiently high, it seems natural to suggest that this is ultimately due to a lack of profits and 
market power.  This is potentially due to prices being held down by: 1) the threat of public 
regulation if pharmaceutical companies raise prices, or 2) patents that are weakly enforced or too 
narrowly defined to allow patent-protected monopolies to raise price appropriately.  However, 
even  with  free  pricing  and  nearly-inelastic  demand,  the  share  of  social  surplus  allocated  to 
producers may be small.  This is most easily illustrated by the constant elasticity case, in which a 
producer share of social surplus of 5% is consistent with monopoly pricing under a demand curve 
that is almost as inelastic as it can be, ￿ = 1.08, as an elasticity below unity, of course, leads to 
infinite profits.  In fact, we showed that higher prices (such as those of HIV/AIDS drugs) induced 
by lower elasticities of demand often lead to less surplus captured by inventors.  Put differently, 
even though profits, of course, rise as the elasticity of demand falls, many times the share of 
social surplus appropriated by the monopolist falls.  This occurs because the non-appropriated 
consumer surplus rises faster than profits as the elasticity falls. 
 
It is important to stress that arguments about the difference between static and dynamic 
efficiency are a different matter than whether prices used for calculating spending in CE analysis 
reflect costs of production in general, and average costs of production (reflecting R&D costs), in 
particular.  Under traditional CE analysis, even if one could measure costs perfectly, and did not 
need to approximate unobserved costs by observed prices, one would be concerned with the 
wrong measure, total ex-post surplus.  This is because the division of the surplus is what matters 
for dynamic R&D policy, as opposed to only the total surplus which is relevant for static policy. 
In particular, this holds true whether the costs represented are marginal or average costs, the latter 
potentially including fixed costs such as R&D.  In both cases, the division of social surplus is 
ignored but is what drives optimal R&D policy. 
 
Several  issues  may  be  important  in  generalizing  our  conclusions  and  are  therefore 
suitable  for  future  research.    The  first  concerns  the  interpretation  of  CE  analysis  in  a  non-
monopoly context; the field of “industrial organization of technology adoption” needs to be better 
understood.  Another concern is the effect of altruism, which seemingly motivates much of public   18 
financing, on optimal technology adoption and the efficient form of surplus appropriation.
30  A 
third concerns the effect of ex-post inefficiencies such as moral hazard.  Fourth, the impact of the 
joint demand of physicians and patients on observed levels of CE must be examined further.  
Fifth, the effect of improved treatment on disease prevalence, whether through increased life-
expectancies  among  infected  individuals  or  increased  risky  behavior  (due  to  lower  costs  of 
infection induced by treatment) among non-infected individuals, must be considered (see e.g. 
Philipson (2000)).  Sixth, the role of public funding, comprising almost half of US medical R&D 
spending, on the optimal degree of appropriation is not well understood.  While much basic 
research in the US is financed by tax-payers (mainly through the NIH), little analysis exists on the 
implications of that for optimal appropriation.
31 
 
Our  analysis  and  evidence,  if  they  generalize  to  other  technologies,  suggest  that 
interventions  aimed  at  raising  innovator  appropriation  may  be  desirable  even  though  full 
appropriation may not be.  This would lead to lower observed levels of cost-effectiveness for 
these technologies as traditionally measured from market prices, but would raise efficiency by not 
unduly sacrificing the health and well being of future patient populations for the benefit of current 
ones. 
                                                 
30 Philipson, Mechoulan, and Jena (2006) discuss optimal technology assessment in the presence of 
altruism that motivates public health care delivery, in general, and R&D into third-world diseases, in 
particular. 
31 The discrimination between public and private funding may be mitigated by private expenditures towards 
the licensing of publicly-funded discoveries.   19 
References 
 
Arrow, Kenneth, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Research for Invention,” in The Rate 
  and  Direction  of  Inventive  Activity:  Economic  and  Social  Factors,”  E.  R.  Nelson, 
  Princeton University Press, 1961. 
 
Becker, Gary S., Philipson, Tomas, Soares, Rodrigo, “The Quantity and Quality of Life and the
  Evolution of World Inequality,” American Economic Review, 2005, Vol. 95, pp. 277- 
291. 
 
Caves, R., Whinston, M., Hurwitz, M., “Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
  Pharmaceutical Industry,” Brookings Paper on Microeconomic Activity,  
Microeconomics, 1991, pp. 1-66. 
 
Cutler,  David  M.,  Your  Money  or  Your  Life:    Strong  Medicine  for  America’s  Health  Care 
  System, Oxford University Press, New York, New York, 2004. 
 
Cutler,  David  M.,  and  Richardson,  Elizabeth,  “The  Value  of  Health:  1970-1990,”  American 
  Economic Review, 1998, Vol. 88, pp. 97-100. 
 
Cutler,  David  M.,  and  McClellan,  Mark,  “Is  Technological  Change  in  Medicine  Worth  It?,” 
  Health Affairs, 2001, Vol. 20, pp. 11-29. 
 
Duggan, Mark, and Evans, William, “The Impact of HIV Antiviral Treatments: Evidence for 
  California' s Medicaid Population,” Working Paper, 2005. 
 
Drummond, M.F., O’Brien, B., Stoddart, G.L, and Torrance, G.W., Methods for the Economic 
  Evaluation of Health care Programmes, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Health, United States; National Center for Health Statistics with Chartbook on Trends in the 
  Health of Americans, Hyattsville, MD, 2002. 
 
Garber,  Alan  M.  and  Phelps,  Charles  E.,  "Economic  Foundations  of  Cost-Effectiveness 
  Analysis," Journal of Health Economics, 1997, Vol. 16, pp. 1-32. 
 
Garber,  Alan  M.,  “Advances in  Cost-Effectiveness Analysis  of  Health  Interventions,”  NBER 
  Working Paper 7198, 1999. 
 
Gold, M.R., Siegel, J.E., Russell, L.B., and Weinstein, M.C., Cost-Effectiveness in Health and 
  Medicine, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Griliches, Zvi. R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, University of Chicago Press,  
1998. 
 
Hall, Bronwyn H., “The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,” Technology, 
  R&D, and the Economy, ed. B. Smith and C. Barfield, Brookings Institution/American 
  Enterprise Institute, 1996. 
 
Johannesson, M., and Weinstein, M.C., “On the Decision Rules of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis,” 
  Journal of Health Economics, 1993, Vol. 12, pp. 459-467. 
   20 
Kates,  J.,  and  Wilson,  A.  “Medicaid  &  HIV/AIDS,”  Pub.  7172,  Henry  J.  Kaiser  Family 
  Foundation, 2004. 
 
Lakdawalla,  Darius,  and  Philipson,  Tomas  J.,”  Intellectual  Property  and  Non-Price
  Discrimination,” University of Chicago, Department of Economics Working Paper, 2005.  
 
Lichtenberg, Frank R., “The Impact of Increased Utilization of HIV Drugs on Longevity and 
  Medical Expenditure: An Assessment Based on Aggregate U.S. Time-Series Data,” 
  Working Paper, Columbia Business School, 2005. 
 
Levin, Richard C., Klevorick, Alvin K., Nelson, Richard R., Winter, Sidney G., Gilbert, Richard, 
  and  Griliches,  Zvi,  “Appropriating  the  Returns  from  Industrial  Research  and 
  Development,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987, Vol. 3, pp. 783-831. 
 
Manning, Richard L., “Changing Rules in the Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines,” 
  Journal of Law and Economics, 1994, Vol. 37, pp. 247-275. 
 
Mansfield, Edwin, “How Rapidly Does New Technology Leak Out?,” The Journal of Industrial 
  Economics, 1985, Vol. 34,  pp. 217-223. 
 
Mansfield, Edwin, Rapoport, John, Romeo, Anthony, Wagner, Samuel, and Beardsley, George, 
  “Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovation,” The Quarterly Journal of 
  Economics, 1977, Vol. 91, pp. 221-240. 
 
Meltzer, David, "Accounting for Future Costs in Medical Cost-Effectiveness Analysis," Journal 
  of Health Economics, 1997, Vol. 16, pp. 33-64. 
 
Nordhaus,  William  D.,  “Schumpeterian  Profits  in  the  American  Economy:  Theory  and 
  Measurement,” NBER Working Paper, 2004. 
 
Phelps, Charles E., and Parente, Stephen T., "Priority Setting in Medical Technology and Medical 
  Practice Assessment," Medical Care, 1990, Vol. 28, pp. 703-723. 
 
Philipson,  T.J.,  “Economic  Epidemiology  and  Infectious  Disease,”  Chapter  in  Handbook  of 
Health Economics.  Edited by J. Newhouse and A. Culyer, Elsevier B.V., North Holland, 
2000. 
 
Philipson,  T.,  and  Jena,  A.B.,  “Who  Benefits  from  Medical  Technologies?  Estimates  of 
Consumer and Producer Surpluses for HIV/AIDS Drugs,” BE Press Forum for Health 
Economics and Policy, Forum: Biomedical Research and the Economy, Article 3, 2005. 
(Also NBER Working Paper #11810) 
 
Philipson, T., Jena, A.B., and Mechoulan, S., “Intellectual Property & External Consumption 
Effects: Generalizations from Pharmaceutical Markets,” NBER Working Paper #11930, 
2006. 
 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA Annual Membership Survey,  
  2003. 
 
Neumann, Peter J., Sandberg, Eileen A., Bell, Chaim M., Stone, Patricia W., and Chapman, 
  Richard H., “Are Pharmaceuticals Cost-Effective? A Review of the Evidence,” Health   21 
  Affairs, 2000, Vol. 19, pp. 92-109. 
 
Shapiro, Martin F., et al. “Variations in the Care of HIV Infected Adults in the United States,” 
  Journal of the American Medical Association, 1999, Vol. 281, pp. 2305-2316. 
 
Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, 1988. 
 
Weinstein, Milton C., and Manning, Willard G., Jr. "Theoretical Issues in Cost-Effectiveness
  Analysis" Journal of Health Economics, 1997, Vol. 16, pp. 121-128. 
 
Weinstein, M.C., and Stason, W.B., “Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Health and 
  Medical Practices,“ New England Journal of Medicine, 1977, Vol. 296, pp. 716-721. 
   22 
Appendix 
 
Assume a constant elasticity demand function and constant returns to scale as in: 
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where ￿  > 0 is the elasticity of demand with respect to price, and x is a demand shifter.   This 
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We can now determine the share of profits in potential social surplus, i.e. the social surplus that 
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That is, the share of profits in potential social surplus is equal to the ratio of the monopolist 





















Using the above expressions, it is straightforward to derive the ratio of gross benefit to spending, 
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